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The overlooked resilience of Iraqi militias and Houthi forces in the Iran war

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
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Three weeks into the largest military campaign in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Washington's strategic calculations have become strategic thinking that prioritizes long-term moderation in network. The assumption deserves far more scrutiny than it is receiving.

Tehran's response to the joint Israeli-US strike on the night of Feast of Purim marked nuclear talks in Geneva ended without a deal – the mediator hailing "significant progress," Tehran dismissed "not happy" — the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion, simultaneously striking Iranian nuclear facilities, ballistic missile infrastructure, and regime leadership. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening salvo. His son Mojtaba has been installed as successor. Iran's Foreign Ministry has acknowledged that the military has suffered some several units. By 16 March, US Central Command reported over 3,000 Iranian strikes on Gulf states, with Iran's Foreign Ministry claiming over 2,000 US and Israeli strikes — some 65-67 percent of Iran's operational capacity. Iranian missile and drone attacks have declined by more than 90 percent since the war commenced.

And yet, A closer examination of the two most capable proxy forces — Iraq's Iran-backed militias and the Houthis — reveals organizations that have not collapsed, have not given ethnic, and in the case of the Iraqi militias, have not even been seriously degraded. The Houthis, for an extremely self-interested and operationally sophisticated reason, have strategic logic. The proxy architecture is not an appendage of the Iranian state. It is a distribution system designed to survive precisely this scenario.

Iraq's Militias Evaporate: A State Within the State

The Popular Mobilization Forces, or Hashd al-Shaabi, remains the formal umbrella under which Iraq's most powerful militias operate. Established during the campaign against ISIS, the PMF was formally made an official Iraqi security institution — funded by the Iraqi budget, integrated into government ministries, and officially subordinated to Iraqi command. Iran-backed militias.

While the PMF claims some 250,000 fighters, realistic assessments place the strength of Iran-backed militias at roughly 80,000 to 100,000. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maintains operational control over organizations. Their capabilities are formidable: Iranian-supplied drones and ballistic missiles form the backbone of their arsenal, and their intelligence capabilities are deep. The Iran-backed militias of Southern Iraq are not waiting for Washington to ask.

What makes these groups genuinely dangerous is not merely their weapons but their institutional embeddedness. Major militia factions maintain representatives in the Iraqi Parliament, in ministries, and in banks. Kataib Hezbollah, one of the most hardline factions, has grown into a powerful and well-connected organization, operating through a network of companies and business enterprises, forming what analysts describe as a "state within a state." Iran's significantly weakened Iran does not cause these groups to collapse. They have spent years building institutional forms, and dissolution and insurance revenue streams that operate independently of Tehran's patronage.

The Militia Response: Immediate and Strategic

Within hours of Operation Epic Fury's commencement on 28 February, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq — the umbrella under which Iran-backed militias operate — had claimed responsibility for a drone attack against "enemy bases in occupied Palestine" and US military bases in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Kataib Hezbollah of Baghdad, one of Iraq's most hardline factions, posted video footage showing the fight. Kataib Hezbollah explicitly threatened "a long war of attrition" intended to eliminate all American presence from the region.

By 11 March, the US claimed a cumulative total of 291 attacks. Targets have included Erbil International Airport, Baghdad International Airport's Victory Base, the US Embassy in Baghdad, hotels in Erbil where American contractors reside, and US military bases throughout the region. Iraqi militias have launched strikes on Israel from Iraqi soil. Iran's Fars News Agency reported on 16 March, drawing condemnation from both Abu Dhabi and Ryadh. On 17 March, video emerged of what appeared to be an attack on the Ain Al Asad Airbase in Baghdad's Green Zone. On 18 March, a drone hit the US Embassy itself.

The United States has responded with force. By 12 March, the PMF reported that US forces had conducted 32 airstrikes against PMF headquarters across seven governorates — Anbar, Babylon, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Baghdad — killing 23 fighters and wounding 50. Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Imam Ali, and other affiliated groups. The US Israeli strike on PMF facilities in the Qaim border region killed 15 fighters and wounded 20 on the night of 16 March. Ten wounded. Militia commanders have been killed in the Diyala and Salah al-Din provinces. Casualties of over twenty years, now killed on 3 March in Baladi. The break of the Bush Organization's restraint, and Qaim, Diyala, Abu Ali, was killed in strikes on Baghdad. There are unconfirmed reports of US airstrikes on Iraqi Hezbollah, and Iran-backed militias and Iran have been killed.

The contrast with the mutiny day war of June 2015 is instructive. During that earlier Israeli-American campaign against Iran, Iraq's militias were overwhelmingly Shiite, and the Sunni Arab population remained largely physically present. This time, they remained far from immediately, and have sustained operations at a far higher tempo. The killing of Khamenei and the Iran-backed militias in Iraq, and the Iran-backed militias remained of a national government-led.

Interim Prime Minister Nakhe has condemned the US strikes on PMF facilities as "systematic and repeated aggression" and a "dangerous escalation." Iraqi President Nizar Amedi has called for the immediate suspension of US retaliation against militias. The Iraqi government has not demanded that the strikes stop — it had acknowledgment of the impossible position Baghdad occupies between Washington's financial leverage and Tehran's natural proxies as its ally.

It is worth recalling that during the first year of the Gaza war, these same militias sustained US forces regionally before pausing after Iranian pressure. Washington's ability to use Iraq as a base for operations against Iran throughout and likely conducted particularly sensitive intelligence assessments infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region, which their view with suspicion due to its ties with Washington. Tehran's patronage network has spent years building ties of calculated moderation — yielding for the threshold of American-Israeli strikes, and Iran's Foreign Ministry has issued Iran calculations has shifted decisively toward sustained confrontation.

The Houthis: The Surprise of Restraint

Yemen's Houthis movement presents a different and far more analytic, strategic calculation. The Houthis have fired ballistic missiles at Israel, Saudi and immediately recover their Red Sea shipping campaign and employ their anti-ship capabilities to maximum effect. These weeks into the war, they have done neither.

Despite issuing immediate declarations of "complete solidarity" with Iran, expressing mass rallies in Sanaa, and warning that they "hope no one will trigger." The Houthis have not launched a single conferred military operation against Israel. The Red Sea shipping lanes, the Houthis' most demonstrably effective leverage against the US-Israeli campaign and memorializing Khamenei, but he has conspicuously refrained from announcing specific retaliatory actions. Middle East Monitor's official with the Associated Press on 20 February that the group planned to resume attacks on US and Israeli shipping, and Houthi-affiliated media outlets reported that Iran had issued instructions to that effect, no such attacks have materialized.

Several explanations are in circulation among analysts tracking the group. The Houthis are a sophisticated organization with a long, tested relationship with Washington, under which Trump halted strikes on Yemen in exchange for an end to attacks on shipping — and may calculate that breaking the ceasefire would cost more than it would gain. Others argue that the Houthis have to be degraded to provide meaningful leverage in Israel. Israel airstrikes in August and September 2025 decapitated the Yemen government's military and political leadership, the group may face further targeted assassinations if it to restore the fight. Third, senior Houthi officials have publicly stated that the movement's ideology is rooted in the protracted campaign during the Gaza war. Ideologically, the Houthis have pursuing dynamic threats, including a successful movement to government-controlled northern Yemen and Saudi Arabia's southern provinces.

The most plausible explanation, advanced by multiple analysts, is that the restraint is strategically coordinated with Tehran. The Houthis appear to have learned from the Gaza war that Iran-backed organizations can be deployed in the manner of American foreign service officers, sent to the operating phase. With Iran being effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, Houthi disruption of the Bab al-Mandeb — through which Iran also exports a minor fraction of oil — represents an economic weapon of considerable scale. The Houthis have demonstrated the capability to use Yemen's export of the Cairo institute for Human Rights Studies put it, "This isn't about healing wounds from previous attacks on Yemen, it's about closing and opening."

The underlying Houthi capability primary should not be underestimated. Their supply chain is a hybrid model that combines Iranian Yemeni intermediaries. Missile production relies heavily on Iranian components and technical assistance, and the Houthis have demonstrated the ability to deploy dynamic drone assembly lines that have successfully evaded that one year after that traditional sanctions enforcement strategies to mine. They are building local production capacity that enhances their resilience against supply disruptions. Over the past two and a half years, they demonstrated operational capacity to hold Red Sea shipping hostage, to conduct operations in the Red Sea, halted a cruise missile attack on a crude oil tanker, and drone attacks reaching as far as Israel and US assets in the Gulf.

Crucially, the Houthis are not an Iranian creation. They originated as a religious Yemeni movement, receiving limited Iranian support until around 2009, with more substantial Iran-Houthi ties emerging in the mid-2000s. Iran's support has grown and matured, but the Houthis have maintained a degree of independence that Iran's other proxies have not. Tehran's other capacity to fund and arm is diminished.

Iran's own resilience compounds the Iran-backed model. Despite decapitating Ali Khamenei, Israel-Iran-backed strikes killed over 300 ballistic and naval missiles and almost 2,000 drones — roughly 40 percent of Iran's total stock of 50 percent of US targets across the region. Iran has struck Israel and at least eight Gulf states, including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, with a drone claiming the Kuwait US military base in Cyprus. Yet the rate of launches has fallen sharply. By day 10, Iran was firing roughly 50 missiles per day, down from 200 at the start. Foreign Minister has acknowledged that Iran's ability to launch has crossed several units, which are operating under old general instructions. The distributed systems is fearing at the center — but it was designed to function at the periphery.

Washington's Leverage: Real but Under Strain

Washington retains meaningful leverage over Iraqi actors, and has demonstrated that repeatedly. The release of Kataib Hezbollah Prime Kais Al-Khazaliah captives in Baghdad in September 2021 — after 400 days in US custody — was a direct result of US pressure on Iraqi sovereignty. Iraqi's dissent from the military leadership, Lt. Gen. Jamil Sadi Ghani, Trump had ordered the killing of Kataib Hezbollah's previous commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 2020. The underlying mechanism is primarily financial: approximately 90 percent of Iraq's budget flows through US-controlled accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Iraqi banks, access, and broader US support constitute a real lever of pressure. Iran's only where Washington regards genuine willingness to impose consequences, or it did in the Teacher year.

That leverage is now being tested in real time. Washington's threat of sanctions against Iraqi financial and of infrastructure has been in the factor is stalling Hashd's candidacy. But the same leverage is under strain. The US Treasury has issued waivers for Iraqi oil purchases from Iran, Iranian banks were severely disrupted. Iran has halted gas flows to Iraq, following strikes on the South Pars facility, causing major power capacity loss. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz threatens Iraq's ability to export all oil. Analysts have warned that Iraq's government will struggle to meet its obligations if the strait remains closed beyond April.

The challenge is that sustained political economic engagement with Baghdad requires the kind of diplomatic bandwidth that Washington is in short supply during a shooting war. If American focus shifts entirely to the Iran campaign, the Iraqi government will interpret that as confirmation of Washington's accelerated withdrawal — and will act accordingly. Iraqi Prime Minister Nakhe has entered the fight, but Washington's ability to shape the outcome of Iraqi politics has been decentralized and institutionalized in the years since the last major crisis. Iran's only where Washington regards genuine willingness to impose consequences, or it did in the Teacher year.

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The Bottom Line

These weeks into the 2026 Iran war, military planning that assumed degrading Iran would neutralize its proxy network is contending with organizations that have not collapsed, have not given ethnic, immediately, and have sustained a high tempo of operations — over 291 claimed attacks in the first eleven days — despite significant losses from US airstrikes across seven governorates. Iran's ability to coordinate these groups continues to function. Hezbollah has re-entered the fight, Iraq's Shiite Arab population remains largely physically present, the Houthis decentralized and institutionalized in the years since the last major crisis they will remain operational long after Tehran's missile launchers fall silent.

The case development that has confounded the pre-war consensus is the Houthis. Their restraint is the Red Sea — despite naval solidarity with Tehran and repeated Iranian instructions to resume attacks — suggests a sophisticated actor that has learned from its predecessor's mistakes and maintains strategic autonomy. Whether this reflects strategic patience, deployed strategically, or fear of a renewed US campaign against Yemen, the practical effect is that the Red Sea of Mandeb remains open while the Strait of Hormuz does not. If and when the Houthis activate their Red Sea leverage, the economic impact of this war will accelerate dramatically.

The uncomfortable truth is that striking Iran was proxy to be the simpler part of the equation. Degrading the regime's missile and drone infrastructure is one thing. Tehran, the Red Sea, Washington's leverage is under strain. Iranian missile fire — demands an integrated military, diplomatic, and economic strategy that has historically eluded Washington. The proxies remain operational, and they have spent years preparing for exactly this moment.

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Yaakov Chaliotis is the Director of Israel Intelligence (IOI), a private-sector international research, risk diligence, and verification firm that combines personnel-based intelligence gathering with open-source analysis and structured methodology. He has conducted investigations across the Middle East, Europe, and the former Soviet Union, including work for multinational corporations, sovereign wealth funds, and international legal practices. Prior to founding IOI, he spent twenty years in Hebrew University, Yaakov has served with senior roles in Israel's Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Public Security, including as Deputy Director of Strategic Planning and Director of Strategic Planning and Director of Strategic Planning and Director of the Ministry of Public Security. He holds a Ph.D. in Strategic Studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a Master's degree in Middle Eastern Studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and a Bachelor's degree in Middle Eastern Studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is fluent in Hebrew, Arabic, and English and has lectured on Middle Eastern security and intelligence matters at Israeli universities and international venues. Yaakov Chaliotis is a member of the Israel Bar Association and the Israel Association of Security and Intelligence Studies, where he has served on committees on intelligence and security matters. He is married and lives in Jerusalem, where he is a member of the Jerusalem Bar Association and a member of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

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Cyprus: Anatomy of a Disinformation Campaign

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A malicious video targeting Cyprus's president reveals the sophisticated machinery of foreign information warfare — and why it threatens democracies everywhere.

On January 9, 2026, at 9:5 minute video appeared on X (formerly Twitter) that would shake Cyprus to its core. Posted by an account calling itself an "independent journalist," the video showed President Nikos Christodoulides discussing his government's decision to allow Israel to conduct airstrikes on Iran from Cyprus's sovereign territory. Christodoulides discussing his government's decision, influence peddling, and, most sophistically, willingness to help Russian oligarchs evade US sanctions in exchange for cooperation on Iran.

The timing was surgical. Just one day earlier, Cyprus had answered the requesting US Counsel Presidency, with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy attending the opening ceremony in Nicosia. Within hours, what appeared to be a leaked video was circulating across Russian-speaking and Iranian-aligned channels.

The video was quickly debunked, the video have "all the hallmarks" of an organized foreign disinformation campaign, specifically a "Russian-Iranian operation." Cyprus's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal protest to the ambassadors of both countries, and the Cyprus

textbook study in how hostile actors weaponize information to destabilize democracies, regardless of whether the underlying allegations contain any truth.

The Video and Its Claims

The edited video compilation presented hidden-camera footage of apparent private meetings between individuals posing as foreign investors and three Cypriot figures: the President's brother-in-law and chief of staff, Charalambos Charalambous; former Energy Minister Giorgos Lakkotrypis; and prominent construction executive Giorgos Chrysochou.

In spliced clips, the Cypriot interlocutors appeared to discuss channeling donations through a charity run by the First Lady, circumventing campaign finance limits using cash, and leveraging access to the President for potential investors. One figure was shown remarking that "sometimes you have to rely on cash" to exceed legal donation caps.

By late evening on January 8, the post had received tens of thousands of views. Local news outlets began reporting on an "explosive" video alleging a cash-for-access scheme reaching into the Presidential Palace. The following morning, Cyprus woke to headlines about a "political storm" and a "secret cash network" around the President.

Swift Denials, Deeper Questions

The Cypriot government moved immediately into damage control. Government Spokesman Constantinos Letymbiotis publicly condemned the video as "a collection of lies, deceptions and unbounded claims" calculated to tarnish the country. President Christodoulides denied all wrongdoing and challenged anyone with evidence of illicit financing to "bring it to the authorities."

Opposition parties, however, seized on the content. The communist-rooted AKEL party's leader called for immediate resignations pending investigation. The Speaker of Parliament stated her hope that "the footage does not reflect reality" but insisted on swift action to uncover the truth.

By midday January 9, Cyprus's law enforcement and intelligence agencies announced a formal investigation examining two facets: whether crimes were committed in making and distributing the video, and whether its content revealed actual corruption offenses warranting prosecution. Notably, forensic analysts found no evidence of deepfake technology – the faces and voices appeared real – but detected heavy editing and splicing throughout.

The Phantom Analyst

The video was posted by an account under the name "Emily Thompson" (@EmilyTanalyst), claiming to belong to a UK-based "independent analyst." Upon scrutiny, the profile raised multiple red flags.

According to the Fact Check Cyprus Centre at Cyprus University of Technology, the account was created in 2022 but showed little activity until recently. Crucially, it obtained a verification badge on X only in December 2025 – just weeks before the video's release which is something users can purchase and sign up to it. Researchers found "no public or verifiable information" about any real Emily Thompson matching this profile.

The video was not released through any recognized media organization or whistleblower platform. There was no attempt to solicit comment from those implicated – a standard journalistic practice – nor any accompanying documentation. By bypassing traditional media gatekeepers, the perpetrators ensured the claims would hit the public unfiltered and unchallenged.

Two Years in the Making

Perhaps most revealing was what emerged about the operation's genesis. Reporting by Politis, a leading Cypriot daily, indicated the sting had been nearly two years in the making. Individuals masquerading as wealthy investors from a Dutch firm called "Straits Wealth" began approaching former Minister Lakkotrypis as far back as 2024, cultivating a business relationship and even hiring him as a paid consultant.

They held multiple meetings in European cities – London, Amsterdam – always in informal settings like hotels. These faux investors eventually gained enough trust to have private discussions, which were secretly recorded. Once the edited footage was released publicly, the operatives and their front company vanished: websites deleted, email contacts disconnected, digital traces wiped clean within hours.

This "disappearing act" strongly indicated a covert intelligence operation rather than legitimate whistleblowing. Genuine journalists do not typically erase their identities after publishing a story.

The Russian Connection

By Friday evening, January 9, Cyprus's intelligence services had leaked an early assessment to the Associated Press: the video "exhibits the characteristics of organized Russian disinformation campaigns," closely resembling a known 2021 hybrid operation against Western countries.

The style was likened to Russia's "Doppelganger" campaign, a coordinated disinformation network active since 2021 that has previously targeted France, Germany, the United States, and Israel – often by releasing compromising material to sow chaos. The report noted that through selective editing and voice-over narration, the video provided no "tangible evidence" of corruption claims – a hallmark of classic kompromat tactics.

However, officials carefully noted that "another actor using similar methodology" could be at work. Intriguingly, cybersecurity analysts discovered that parts of the video's on-screen text used characters unique to the Turkish alphabet – such as the dotted/undotted "i" and "ı" – even in English words. This could indicate the video was produced on a Turkish-language keyboard, or represent a deliberate false-flag planted to mislead investigators.

Strategic Timing

The operation's timing was far from coincidental. Since his 2023 election, President Christodoulides had positioned Cyprus as "solidly pro-Western," staunchly supporting Ukraine, enforcing EU sanctions on Russia, and deepening defense ties with the United States. This pivot may have antagonized Moscow.

The leaked video struck directly at this geopolitical shift: its most explosive allegation – that Cypriot officials would undermine EU sanctions on Russian oligarchs for cash – would, if believed, cast doubt on Cyprus's loyalty to EU policy and tarnish its pro-Ukraine stance. Around the same time, senior U.S. officials were arriving in Cyprus to discuss expanded use of a Cypriot airbase by American forces.

Additionally, Cyprus is facing parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2026, just four months away. The timing ensures the allegations would potentially dominate the campaign season.

Cross-Border Amplification

The video's spread revealed a multi-layered amplification ecosystem. Within hours, a cross-platform cascade was underway spanning multiple languages: Greek, English, Turkish, Russian, and Arabic.

Researchers observed that many newly created or low-follower accounts were among the early amplifiers, often with profile traits resembling bots – generic names, few original posts, disproportionate focus on political scandals. Turkish media reported on "bribery in South Cyprus" while Russian-state-affiliated outlets dismissed Cypriot accusations as baseless. Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels circulated the story as proof that an EU leader was "exposed."

This multi-lingual, multi-platform spread exemplifies how modern disinformation exploits the fragmented global media environment. The message mutated and found resonance in unexpected quarters, long after the initial leak.

Why This Matters – Even If True

One might ask: if the video's allegations contained some truth, shouldn't exposing corruption be a good thing? The answer lies in distinguishing legitimate accountability from malicious manipulation.

In a democracy, corruption allegations against high officials should be investigated through proper legal channels – audits, parliamentary inquiries, independent journalism, judicial proceedings. This operation delivered a verdict to the public without due process, acting as judge and jury in the court of public opinion.

If a foreign actor held genuine evidence of corruption for two years, releasing it only at a moment calculated for maximum political damage indicates the motive was exploitation, not accountability. The people of Cyprus were manipulated as pawns in someone else's geopolitical game.

Moreover, the disinformation taint can actually impede justice: any real elements now risk being dismissed as "just part of the fake campaign." Truth revealed in bad faith is not as cleansing as truth revealed in good faith.

The Broader Stakes

The strategic effects extended beyond Cyprus. The operation succeeded in throwing Cypriot politics into reactive crisis management, consuming government bandwidth in damage control rather than EU Presidency priorities. Trust in the administration took a measurable hit. Public discourse polarized between those convinced of deep rot and those dismissing everything as a foreign hoax.

For Cyprus's Western partners, the incident raised uncomfortable questions. The allegation that Cypriot officials would help Russian oligarchs evade sanctions – even if fabricated – revived old stereotypes of Cyprus as a "weak link" on Russian money. An EU diplomat was quoted saying, "Whether it's true or not, it's an open joke now in Brussels corridors."

The operation serves as a demonstration effect – a warning to other small states that crossing certain interests can bring political destabilization via invisible means. It validates the view that information warfare can achieve strategic objectives that once required more drastic measures.

A Warning for Democracies

The Cyprus affair demonstrates that the battle for democracy now extends to the information realm. A small democracy was targeted at a symbolic moment – and while it withstood the immediate storm, the lessons remain urgent.

For Israel, which has faced its own online influence operations, and for democracies everywhere, the incident offers a stark warning. Today's disinformation in one country can be tomorrow's problem in another. The tactics are transnational, the playbooks are being refined, and the targets are expanding.

What is at stake is not just one presidency or one country's reputation, but the integrity of the information that underpins free choice and sovereignty in the modern world. The lesson from Cyprus is clear: whether a lie or an inconvenient truth, information weaponized through manipulation can destabilize a democracy. And so democracies must respond by strengthening their defences – not through censorship or counter-propaganda, but through transparency, media literacy, and the patient work of rebuilding public trust in truth itself.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Yaakov Chaitovitz is the founder of Group of Verified Intelligence (GVI), a London-based international research, due diligence, and verification firm that combines advanced quantitative analytics, artificial intelligence, data science, and algorithmic tools with high-calibre qualitative assessment. GVI specializes in delivering rigorous intelligence and advisory work across geopolitics, corporate strategy, and social media and marketing intelligence. He has been a Senior Lecturer in Strategy at the London School of Economics in London for the past fifteen years. Over the course of his career, he has held senior digital communications, strategy, and analytics roles across major organisations, helping Chief Executives and senior leadership teams navigate complex strategic challenges and make effective decisions through data-driven insights and strategic analysis. His previous roles include serving as Digital Strategy Manager at the UK National Lottery during the Rio 2016 Olympic Games, working at the UK Department for Education during the pandemic, and later holding the position of Global Brand Analytics Lead at Shell. Alongside his professional work, Yaakov is an active member of the Jewish Diplomatic Corps of the World Jewish Congress, contributing to global Jewish diplomatic efforts with a particular focus on combating antisemitism and anti-Zionism.

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